The system of functional harmonic analysis surely has a quasi-scientific aura about it, and it is significant that, most of the time, two competent practitioners of the system will arrive at the same interpretations of the harmonic structure of a given musical passage. But the notion that this "invented language … describe what is happening in music" in a way comparable to how chemistry addresses physical phenomena is an illusion, and in the case of theorists like Schenker who fabricate their central concepts out of whole cloth, a delusion. The principal problem is that the quasi-scientific language of theory is hopelessly skewed toward a single parameter, its tonal-harmonic organization, making the aphorism "to one whose only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail" particularly apt. There is good reason to believe that thematic organization, thematic processes, and so-called narrative design have played at least as big a role in musical structure for a couple of centuries as did tonal-harmonic factors, but because there is no quasi-scientific language at play in these domains, these areas have been understudied and undervalued. The scientific view of theory and its language has, according to a number of thinkers, been a significant impediment to a broad, work-centered music criticism and to efforts to figure out "what is happening in music." Joseph Kerman's Contemplating Music and "How We Got into Analysis and How We Can Get out of It", Janet Levy's "Covert and Casual Values in Recent Writings about Music," and Ruth Solie's "The Living Work: Organicism and Musical Analysis," among many others, critically examine the dubious assumption that harmonocentric music theory actually yields a comprehensive view of what is happening in music.